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Stallings: Accountant Liability: Putting Ultramares Out to Pasture

CASE COMMENT
ACCOUNTANT LIABILITY: PUTTING ULTRAMARES
OUT TO PASTURE*

First FloridaBank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla.
1990)
Respondent, a certified public accountant, prepared audited financial statements for his client.' The financial statements overstated the
client's assets and failed to show major liabilities. 2 Respondent presented the financial statements to petitioner, a bank, to secure a loan
for his client.3 Petitioner relied upon the financial statements in loaning
$500,000 to respondent's client. 4 When the client defaulted on the loan,
petitioner sued respondent, alleging negligence and gross negligence
in the preparation of the financial statements.5 The trial court granted
respondent's motion for summary judgment because petitioner was
not in contractual privity with respondent.6 The Florida Second Dis-

*Dedicated to my parents, William F. and Susan S. Stallings; my brother, Jason; and my
accountant friend, Todd Sullivan. Special thanks to my advisor, Johnathan Short.
1. First Fla. Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990). Respondent, Max
Mitchell, was president of his public accounting firm, Max Mitchell & Co. Id. at 10. Respondent's
client was C.M. Systems, Inc. Id.
2. Id. at 11. The audited statements showed that C.M. Systems had $3,474,336 in total
assets and $1,296,823 in total liabilities. Id. at 10. Also, the statements showed that C.M.
Systems was not indebted to any bank, and respondent told petitioner's representative that
G.M. Systems did not owe money to any bank. Id. Respondent also told petitioner's representative that G.M. System's financial condition had not materially changed since the audited
statements were prepared. Id. at 11. In reality, C.M. Systems owed banks at least $750,000,
and G.M. Systems's condition had changed materially since the audit was prepared. Id.
3. Id. at 10. Respondent met with the petitioner's representative frequently during the
loan negotiations, and represented himself as a certified public accountant familiar with the
financial condition of G.M. Systems. Id.
4. Id. at 11. Petitioner extended a $500,000 unsecured line of credit to the respondent's
client, and the respondent's client borrowed the full amount under the line. Id.
5. Id. The complaint originally alleged fraud in addition to negligence and gross negligence,
but petitioner voluntarily dismissed the fraud count. Id.
6. Id. In granting summary judgment, the trial court relied upon Gordon v. Etue, Wardlaw
& Co., 511 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1st D.G.A. 1987), which held: "Florida law denies relief for a breach
of due care by an accountant to third parties who are not in privity with that accountant, even
though reliance by the third parties is known or anticipated." First Fla. Bank v. Max Mitchell
& Co., 541 So. 2d 155, 156 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1989) (quoting Gordon, 511 So. 2d at 389).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 8
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

trict Court of Appeal affirmed. 7 The Florida Supreme Court quashed
the district court's decision s and HELD, that in the absence of privity,
an accountant may be liable to a third party for negligent preparation
of financial statements relied upon by the third party in a transaction,
if the accountant intended to supply the statements to the third party
and intended to influence the transaction with the statements. 9

7. FirstFla., 541 So. 2d at 157. The district court of appeal reluctantly applied the strict
privity doctrine, but stated that "a modification of the doctrine, such as was made with regard
to its application to abstracters, may be justified where the accountant knows that the third
party is going to act in reliance on the financial statements he has prepared." Id. The district
court of appeal certified the following question to the Florida Supreme Court:
WHERE AN ACCOUNTANT FAILS TO EXERCISE REASONABLE AND
ORDINARY CARE IN PREPARING THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF
HIS CLIENT AND WHERE THAT ACCOUNTANT PERSONALLY DELIVERS AND PRESENTS THE STATEMENTS TO A THIRD PARTY TO INDUCE
THAT THIRD PARTY TO LOAN TO OR INVEST IN THE CLIENT, KNOWING THAT THE STATEMENTS WILL BE RELIED UPON BY THE THIRD
PARTY IN LOANING TO OR INVESTING IN THE CLIENT, IS THE ACCOUNTANT LIABLE TO THE THIRD PARTY IN NEGLIGENCE FOR THE
DAMAGES THE THIRD PARTY SUFFERS AS A RESULT OF THE ACCOUNTANT'S FAILURE TO USE REASONABLE AND ORDINARY CARE
IN PREPARING THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, DESPITE A LACK OF
PRIVITY BETWEEN THE ACCOUNTANT AND THE THIRD PARTY?
Id.
8. First Fla., 558 So. 2d at 16. The supreme court also remanded the case for further
proceedings. Id.
9. Id. at 15-16. The instant court explicitly adopted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 552 (1976), which provides that:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information
for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information,
if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating
the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited
to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends
to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to
influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information extends
to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is created,
in any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol42/iss3/8

2

Stallings: Accountant Liability: Putting Ultramares Out to Pasture
CASE COMMENT

Traditionally, a plaintiff could recover for economic damage caused
by a professional's negligent misrepresentation only if the plaintiff had
contractual privity with the professional. 10 This strict privity requirement" severely limited the potential liability of professionals including
accountants.Y The modern trend, however, is to modify or eliminate
the strict privity requirement for professional liability, and allow recovery in certain circumstances where the plaintiff is not in contractual
privity with the professional. 13

The seminal case on accountant liability in the absence of contractual privity has long been Ultramares Corp. v. Touche.14 In Ultramares, an accounting firm negligently prepared thirty-two certified
copies of a balance sheet for its client. 15 The accounting firm knew
the client routinely distributed balance sheets to creditors and inves-

tors for use in financial transactions.1 The client, however, did not
tell the accountants which creditors and investors would rely upon
the balance sheets or for what transactions those creditors and investors would use the balance sheets. 7 Subsequently, a creditor relied

10. Privity, therefore, was an essential element of negligent misrepresentation. Cf. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842) (defendant under contract with
postmaster to repair and maintain coaches could not be liable to postmaster's employee for
injuries caused by negligently maintained coach, because the employee was not in privity of
contract with the defendant).
11. Id.
12. See Cooper, Accountants' Liability: Privity Rule is Necessary in Today's Marketplace,
203 N.Y.L.J. 67, col. 1 (1990).
13. See A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973) (holding an architect liable
to a contractor for the economic loss caused by the architect's negligent preparation of plans);
Durham v. Palm Court, Inc., 558 So. 2d 59 (4th D.C.A.) (holding accountant liable for economic
loss caused by negligent misrepresentation), appeal dismissed, 566 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1990); see
also Donnelly Constr. Co. v. OberglHunt/Gilleland, 139 Ariz. 184, 677 P.2d 1292 (1984) (holding
architect liable for foreseeable economic loss caused by negligent preparation of plans); Howell
v. Fisher, 49 N.C. App. 488, 272 S.E.2d 19 (1980) (holding engineers liable to shareholders for
economic loss caused by negligent soil tests), review denied, 302 N.C. 218,277 S.E.2d 69 (1981).
14. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). Many courts have cited to Ultramares in denying
third parties' recovery for economic damage caused by accountants' negligent misrepresentations.
See, e.g., Investment Corp. of Fla. v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d 291 (2d D.C.A.) (adopting the
Ultramaresposition in Florida), cert. denied, 216 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1968), overruled, 558 So. 2d
9 (Fla. 1990); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d
110, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1985) (reaffirming Ultramares and noting widespread acceptance of the
strict privity doctrine).
15. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 174, 174 N.E. at 442.
16. Id.
17. Id. The Ultramarescourt noted that "t]he range of the transactions in which a certificate
of audit might be expected to play a part was as indefinite and wide as the possibilities of the
business that was mirrored in the summary." Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 8
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

upon these balance sheets to extend credit to the client.18 When the
client defaulted on the loan, the creditor sued the accounting firm for
negligent misrepresentation.19
The Ultramarescourt dismissed the creditor's action, 20 finding that
an accountant could not be liable for negligent misrepresentation to a
third party not in privity with the accountant. 21 Writing for the court,
Justice Cardozo relied upon public policy considerations and decided
not to extend an accountant's duty of care beyond privity.- Justice
Cardozo found that in the accounting profession, an accountant's work
product often is distributed to many different third parties.Moreover, the accounting profession, by its nature, presents numerous
opportunities for error.- This combination of the wide dissemination
of work product and the high probability of potential negligence concerned Justice Cardozo, who reasoned that exposure to such liability
would make the practice of accounting extremely vulnerable to litigation. Thus, the Ultramares court held that an accountant's liability
for negligent misrepresentation is limited to those persons in privity
with the contract.2 6
In 1968 the Florida Second District Court of Appeal adopted the
Ultramares strict privity rule for accountant liability in Investment
Corp. of Florida v. Buchman.2 The accountants in Buchman negligently prepared a corporation's financial statements, knowing that an

18. Id. at 175, 174 N.E. at 443.
19. Id. at 176, 174 N.E. at 443. The complaint also alleged fraud. Id. The trial court
dismissed the fraud count and the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. Id. While the New
York Court of Appeals dismissed the claim of negligent misrepresentation for lack of privity,
the court reinstated the claim of fraud, holding that a jury could find that the negligence of the
accountants supported an inference of fraud. Id. at 192-93, 174 N.E. at 449.
20. Id. at 193, 174 N.E. at. 450.
21. Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
22. Id. at 180, 174 N.E. at. 444.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. In an oft quoted passage, Cardozo writes:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect
a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants
to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme
as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty
that exposes to these consequences.
Id.
26. Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
27. 208 So. 2d 291 (2d D.C.A.), cert. dismissed, 216 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1968), overruled, 558
So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol42/iss3/8

4

Stallings: Accountant Liability: Putting Ultramares Out to Pasture
CASE COMMENT

investor would rely upon the statements to purchase a large block of
the corporation's stock.2 The district court in Buchman cited Ultra-

mares and its progeny for the proposition that an accountant is not
liable in negligence for economic harm suffered by parties outside the
contractual relationship.3 Applying the Ultramares standard, the
Buchman court held that, in the absence of privity, an accountant

could not be liable to a third party even though the accountant knew
of the third party's reliance.3' Florida courts, up to and including the
district court in the instant case, relied upon the Buchman rule to
limit accountant's liability to strict privity. 2
The Buchman court adopted the historical rationale of Florida

precedent limiting abstracter liability to strict privity.s Florida's limitation of an abstracter's liability to strict privity traces to 1940.3 The
doctrine of strict privity for professional liability began to erode, however, when the Florida Supreme Court abolished the strict privity
requirement for abstracters. In FirstAmerican Title Insurance Co.

28. Id. at 292.
29. Id. at 293-96. The court cited as the progeny of Ultramares: Sickler v. Indian River
Abstract & Guar. Co., 142 Fla. 528, 195 So. 195 (1940) (holding that an abstracter cannot be
liable to a third party in the absence of privity even when the abstracter knew of the third
party's reliance); State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938) (holding
that an accountant cannot be liable for negligence to a third party in the absence of privity
even when the accountant knew that a certain third party intended to rely on financial statements
that the accountant had prepared). Buchman, 208 So. 2d at 293-96.
30. But cf. Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) (holding a bean weigher
liable to a bean buyer, in the absence of privity, for the negligent preparation of a certificate
of weight, when supplying the certificate of weight to the buyer was the "end and aim of the
transaction").
31. Buchman, 208 So. 2d at 295-96.
32. See First Fla. Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 541 So. 2d 155, 157 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1989)
(citing Buchman for the proposition that "Florida law denies relief against an accountant for
negligence or gross negligence"); Gordon v. Etue, Wardlaw & Co., 511 So. 2d 384, 389 (Fla.
1st D.C.A. 1987) (finding that "we deal here with accountants, and the specter of worldwide
liability for that professional group compels us to adhere to the rule set forth in Investment
Corp. of Fla.v. Buchman"); Investors Tax Sheltered Real Estate, Ltd. v. Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath, 370 So. 2d 815, 817 (3d D.C.A. 1979) (citing Buchman in affirming the
lower court's dismissal of a negligence action against an accountant in the absence of privity),
cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1980). But see Durham v. Palm Court, Inc., 558 So. 2d 59
(4th D.C.A.) (allowing investors to sue accountants in negligence without privity, despite clear
case law to the contrary), cert. dismissed, 566 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1990).
33. Buchman, 208 So. 2d at 294. The Buchman court found the rationale for limiting
abstracters' liability convincing enough to note: "the Florida Supreme Court in commenting
upon the liability of a title abstracter to third parties enunciated a rule of law which is applicable
to the present issue." Id.
34. See Siclder v. Indian River Abstract & Guar. Co., 142 Fla. 528, 195 So. 195 (1940).
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v. First Title Service Co.,35 a title insurer relied upon a negligently
prepared abstract to issue policies.3 6 The complaint alleged that the
abstracter knew third parties would rely on the abstract. s7 Under
prior Florida case law such knowledge did not create a duty in the
absence of privity.3 The issue before the court was whether to follow
the traditional strict privity requirement or expand the scope of
39
abstracter liability to allow recovery.
In determining the appropriate standard, the FirstAmerican court
considered the test of reasonable foreseeability as an alternative to
the strict privity requirement.40 Under the reasonable foreseeability
test, a third party damaged by the abstracter's negligence could recover from the abstracter if the third party's reliance upon the abstract
was reasonably foreseeable.41 After considering this alternative, the
court declined to adopt this standard. The court, however, did extend
abstracters' liability beyond strict privity. 2 The court held that an
abstracter could be liable to a third party in the absence of privity if
the abstracter knew or should have known that the abstracter's customer intended for the third party to rely on the abstract.4
Florida courts have extended professional liability beyond privity
for other professionals as well as abstracters.- In certain circumstances, plaintiffs have recovered from lawyers and architects in
the absence of contractual privity.4 5 With the general erosion of the
strict privity doctrine for professional liability, the instant court re-

35. 457 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1984).
36. Id. at 468.
37. Id.
38. See Sickler, 142 Fla. at 533, 195 So. at 198.
39. First Am., 457 So. 2d at 468.
40. Id. at 469-72. The court compared the rule of Williams v. Polgar, 391 Mich. 6, 215
N.W.2d 149 (1974) (holding an abstracter liable for negligence when a third party's reliance is
foreseeable, despite a lack of privity), with the doctrine of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255
N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) (limiting accountants' liability to those in privity of contract with
the accountants). FirstAm., 457 So. 2d at 469-72.
41. See Williams, 391 Mich. at 9, 215 N.W.2d at 150.
42. FirstAm., 457 So. 2d at 473 (stating that "[t]he effect of our holding in this case will
be to change the law of abstracter's liability, but not so drastically as the petitioner would have
us change it").
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973) (holding an architect
liable in negligence to a contractor in the absence of privity); McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d
1167 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1976) (holding a lawyer liable to a third party, in the absence of privity,
for negligently drafting a will).
45. See A.R. Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 397; McAbee, 340 So. 2d at 1167.
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examined the Buchman strict privity rule for accountant liability. 46
The instant court discussed the competing interests of accountants
and those who rely upon accountants' work product. In this analysis,
the instant court noted that modern businesses rely upon accountants'
financial reports to facilitate smooth commercial transactions. 47 Given
this reliance, the instant court found that allowing only those in privity
to recover would be "unduly restrictive."
The instant court, dissatisfied with the strict privity requirement,
examined less restrictive alternatives. 49 The instant court, like the
First American court, considered and rejected the reasonable
foreseeability test for liability.a° Under the reasonable foreseeability
test, accountants could be liable for negligent preparation of financial
statements, even if third-party use of the financial statements is remote, unintended, and beyond the accountant's control.51 The instant
court, reasoning that accountants have no control over their clients'
financial records or the distribution of financial statements, declined
to hold accountants liable for consequences beyond their control.52
Instead of adopting the reasonable foreseeability test, the instant
court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 552.63 The
Restatement provides that an accountant is not liable to a third party
unless the third party relies upon information intentionally supplied
by the accountant. The Restatement also requires that a third party
rely upon that information in a transaction which the accountant intended to influence4
The instant court found the Restatement standard less restrictive
than strict privity, yet limited enough to protect accountants from
46. See First Fla. Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9, 12-14 (Fla. 1990).
47. Id. at 14 (citing Annotation, Liability of Public Accountant to Third Parties, 46
A.L.R.3d 979, 984 (1972) (setting out competing interests and describing arguments for and
against extending accountant liability, including- lack of accountants' control over who relies on
their work versus the degree of commercial reliance on accountants' work; potentially higher
insurance costs for accountants versus the accounting profession's ability to absorb insurance
costs; and the potential protection from liability accountants can obtain through the use of
waivers versus the commercial unfeasibility of waivers)).
48. FirstFla., 558 So. 2d at 15.
49. Id. at 12-15.
50. Id. at 14-15.
51. See Williams v. Polgar, 391 Mich. 6, 215 N.W.2d 149 (1974).
52. FirstFla., 558 So. 2d at 15. In support of this proposition, the court favorably cited
Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 322 N.C. 200, 214-15, 367 S.E.2d 609,
617 (1988) (adopting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1976) and recognizing the
need to protect accountants "from liability that unreasonably exceeds the bounds of their real
undertaking"). FirstFla., 558 So. 2d at 15.
53. FirstFla., 558 So. 2d at 14.
54. RESTATEMIENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1976).
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excessive liability.- Applying the Restatement test to the facts of the
instant case, the instant court found that respondent's conduct of intentionally using financial statements to influence petitioner to make
a loan met the Restatement test for liability.5 In holding the respondent accountant liable in the absence of privity, the court explicitly
57
overruled Buchman.
The Buchman strict privity requirement for accountant liability,
which the instant court abandoned, had three positive effects: (1) the
accountant was liable only for consequences within the accountant's
control;5 (2) the accounting and insurance industries had a clearly
identifiable standard upon which to base their conduct and rates;- and
(3) the accounting professional sustained limited litigation and insurance costs.60 The instant court's adoption of the Restatement standard
preserves the first and second effects. However, the instant court's
choice of the Restatement approach probably will lead to higher costs
for accountants. The instant court decided to allow petitioner to recover under the Restatement standard despite public policy concerns
61
with higher accountants' costs.
Accountants' increased costs are attributable partially to the lack
of control that accountants have over the number or identity of those
relying upon their work product. 62 As Justice Cardozo recognized in
Ultramares,the strict privity requirement protected accountants from
potentially limitless liability by limiting their duty of care to contracting parties. 3 Under this standard, accountants had direct control over
the parties with whom they contracted and thus could control the
parties to whom they owed a duty of care. As a result of this direct
control, the strict privity requirement allowed accountants to control
their potential liability. This allowed accountants to assume responsibility for only those uses of financial statements they knew and agreed
to prior to their preparation of the financial statements.6 The Ultra-

55. FirstFla., 558 So. 2d at 15.
56. Id. at 16.
57.

Id.

58. See Cooper, supra note 12.
59. See id.
60. See Amhowitz, The Accounting Profession and the Law: The Misunderstood Victim,
J. ACOT., May 1987, at 356 [hereinafter Accounting Profession]; Amhowitz, Insurer'sPresident
Backs Tort Reform to CombatLiability, J. AcCT., Jan. 1987, at 28 [hereinafter Tort Reform].
61. FirstFla., 558 So. 2d at 14.
62. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931); Annotation, supra note 47.
63. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
64. Cooper, supra note 12.
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mares decision reflected Justice Cardozo's concern that without this
control the accounting profession would be overburdened with liability.6
The Restatement standard addresses this liability concern by limiting liability to situations where accountants intend for the plaintiff to
rely upon the financial statements.6 The Restatement intent requirement allows accountants to control their assumption of liability.6 Accountants can limit their liability by providing financial statements
expressly for the use of named parties.r When accountants intend for
third parties to use financial statements, they voluntarily expose themselves to liability to those parties. Under the Restatement, accountants' liability is limited by their intent7 ° Accountants are liable only
for those consequences within their control, thus the Restatement
preserves the first positive effect of the strict privity requirement.
The second positive effect of the strict privity requirement was
the clear standard of liability upon which accountants and insurers
could base their business decisions. 71 Accountants need to know the
extent of their potential liability to determine whether to prepare a
financial statement for a client. Additionally, this information is necessary to determine the contractual terms that control accountants' relationships with clients.7 Moreover, insurers need to know the extent
of accountants' liability to properly assess the risks of providing liability insurance for accountants.7 Because insurers examine long-term
trends to determine the risks of insuring accountants, stability in the
law is vital to a correct risk assessment."
When courts rigidly enforced the strict privity requirement,75 the
law of accountant liability had the stability necessary for insurers

65. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a)-(b) (1976).
67. See id. comment a (explaining the importance of this element of control: "[T]he duty
of care to be observed in supplying information for use in commercial transactions implies an
undertaking to observe a relative standard, which may be defined only in terms of the use to
which the information will be put, weighed against the magnitude and probability of loss .....
68. See Annotation, supra note 47.
69. This voluntary exposure to liability is what separates the RESTATEMENT test from the
foreseeability test. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a)-(b) (1976).
71. See Tort Reform, supra note 60.
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTE § 552 comment a (1976).
73. See Tort Reform, supra note 60.

74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Investment Corp of Fla. v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d 291 (2d D.C.A.), cert.
dismissed, 216 So. 2d 748 (Fla.1968), overruled, 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990); Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
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properly to assess risks and determine rates. However, the erosion
of the strict privity doctrine in other professions 76 and the abolition
of the strict privity requirement in other jurisdictions- has created
uncertainty in the law of accountant liability. The instant court's adoption of the Restatement standard should eliminate much of the uncertainty. The language and accompanying comments of the Restatement
provide a clear and understandable standard for accountant liability. 7
To further clarify this standard and preserve the second positive effect
under the strict privity requirement, a significant body of law interpreting the Restatement standard already exists.79
While the stability that the Restatement standard provides will
enable insurers to determine properly risks and rates for accountant
liability insurance, those rates likely will be higher than they were
under the strict privity requirement.- Thus, lower industry costs, the
third positive effect under the strict privity standard, are sacrificed
under the instant court's expansion of accountant liability. Plaintiffs
not in privity with accountants now have a cause of action under the
Restatement where no cause of action was available under the strict
privity requirement.81 The existence of an additional cause of action
against accountants logically will result in increased litigation and thus
higher litigation costs for the accounting profession.8 Plaintiffs will
prevail in some of these lawsuits, and the greater number of damage
awards against accountants will drive up the cost of accountant liability
insurance.

76. See, e.g., First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. First Title Serv. Co., 457 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1984);
A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973); McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167
(Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1976).
77. See, e.g., Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (determining an accountant's liability by balancing various factors); Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 257 Ga. 131, 356 S.E.2d
198 (1987) (adopting the RESTATEMENT standard for Georgia, but nevertheless finding accountant not liable); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983) (holding that
accountants may be liable to all whose reliance was reasonably foreseeable).
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1976).
79. See, e.g., Pahre v. Auditor of State, 422 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1988) (finding an accountant
not liable to a third party under the RESTATEMENT since the third party did not belong to a
class intended by the accountant to use the financial statements); Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander
Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898, 451 A.2d 1308 (1982) (finding the RESTATEMENT sets reasonable
boundaries of liability); First Nat'l Bank v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1989) (determining
that an accountant's standard of care under the RESTATEMENT is dependent on generally
accepted accounting principles).
80. See Tort Reform, supra note 60.
81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1976).
82. See Accounting Profession, supra note 60.
83. See Tort Reform, supra note 60.
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The instant court recognized this potential for higher accountant
costs," but decided that the law should provide a remedy for the
petitioner and those similarly wronged.1 The instant court decided
that accountants should bear the losses associated with negligent preparation of financial statements when the facts meet the conditions of
the Restatement. This policy decision allocates the burden of loss on
the parties best positioned to prevent the harm - accountants.8 6 While
accountants will bear the initial burden, market forces will tend to
distribute the costs of liability to the accountants' clients and eventually to the public at largeY
The instant court's adoption of the Restatement standard is a sound
and reasonable extension of accountant liability beyond the strict privity doctrine. Under the Restatement, accountants still are liable only
for consequences within their control,8 and the rule establishes a
clearly identifiable standard of liability. 9 Additionally, allocating the
risk to those best equipped to avoid it promotes fairness and constitutes sound public policy. Finally, the instant court abandons the strict
privity requirement for accountant liability first set forth in Ultramares, replacing a predictable, but inequitable standard with a reasonable standard that advances stability.
Stephen Stallings

84.

First Fla. Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9, 14 (Fla. 1990).

85.

Id.

86. See Annotation, supra note 47.
87. See Accounting Profession, supra note 60, at 364.
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1976).
89. Id.
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